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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
AMI1 ~RICAN LJFE. IN~UH.ANCE CO:.MPANY successor to
C(lNTI~ENTAL REPUBLIC LIFE

N.ArPION.AL

I0I~URANCE

COl\I:PANY,
PlaiHtiff-Appellant,
-vs.IL\ YOU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et

Case
No.10138

al.,

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
~T.ATE~IENT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

In an action to foreclose a mortgage on a country
club, defendant Bayou Country Club, hereinafter called
B..:\YOU. counterclain1ed, asserting the loan was usurious
and claiming forfeiture of unpaid interest, treble the
amount of an alleged discount, treble the amount of sums
paid allocable to interest, and an attorney's fee.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court at pretrial ruled:
(1) Bayou did not receive value to the extent of $14,500.00 on a $65,000 loan, despite receipt by it of a satis-
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faction of its outstanding note in the amount of $15,000,
executed by Bayou in favor of a third party, Frank A.
Nelson, Jr.
( 2)

The loan was usurious.

(3) Payments on the $65,000 loan could not be allotted to principal rather than to interest.
(4) The amount of $14,500 was held to be a discount and it, together with installment payments allocable to interest in the amount of $2630.27 should be
trebled and awarded to Bayou.
(5) Bayou was not estopped to assert usury.
The trial court ruled :
(6)

The Utah usury statutes are constitutional.

( 7) Plaintiff was given judgment on its complaint
for $65,293.81 together with $6000 attorneys' fees and
costs.
(8) Bayou was given judgmen~ on its counterclaim
for $51,390.81 together with $5000 attorneys' fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an award of interest on its note and
reversal of Bayou's judgment on its counterclaim and
dismissal of the counterclaim. In the alternative, appellant seeks reversal of Bayou's judgment on its counterclaim with a remand for trial on the questions of usury
and estoppel and with direction that, in the event Bayou
should recover on its counterclaim, such recovery should
exclude treble the amount of the $14,500 discount.
STATEMENT OF FACT S
A statement of facts which can be made based upon
1
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the n·eord in this case is necessarily fragmentary because
the ('Ourt, at a pretrial hearing, entertained a motion by
Bayou for sununary judg1nent, made without any notice,
and grantPd the motion without affording plaintiff an
oppnrt unity to present evidence, despite the complicated
factual situation involved.
Inasmuch as all issues except constitutionality and
amount of attonwys fPPS were decided on summary judgmPnt, the facts on all issues except those two should be
considered in a light most favorable to appellant.
This action was cmnmenced by Continental Republic
Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation, to foreclose on a $65,000 note and mortgage executed by Bayou.
Bayou was a newly incorporated corporation organized
for profit. It was organized for the purpose of constructing club facilities and selling memberships to buyers,
who would have no equity in the facilities, but only the
right to use them. (R. 445, p. 2-3)
The venture was underfinanced. Mter acquiring
land southeast of Salt Lake City, and starting construction of a clubhouse thereon, the corporation ran out of
money. (R. +±5, p. ±) Being desperately in need of funds,
George Padjen, Leland Olsen and Nolan Olsen, the officers and organizers of the Bayou, asked Frank A. Nelson, Jr.. the president of the Murray State Bank, where
the new club had its account, to find a lender who would
lend them enough to complete their building project.
Because of the nature of the loan and insolvency of
the borrower, the Murray State Bank was not interested
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in making the loan. Nelson, as Bayou's agent, approached
Marvin Bainum, the president of Continental Republic
Life Insurance Company, to interest that company in
making a loan. A loan was made by Continental. A $65,000
note was executed by Bayou. Bayou received an insurance policy, $50,000 cash and cancellation of Bayou's outstanding note in the amount of $15,000 payable to Nelson.
There is no evidence at all as to the consideration for the
$15,000 note, or why or when it was given, but there is
nothing to indicate that it was other than what it purported to be on its face. Assuming there was a cancellation of Bayou's debt to Nelson, as the court considering
the matter on summary judgment should have done,
Bayou received full value for the $65,000 loan.
The lower court however assumed that there never
was a debt from Bayou to Nelson, and that the note for
$15,000 and cancellation thereof was fictitious. In the
event this court should also assume the $15,000 note
was fictitious, we set forth the following additional facts.
It was agreed that there should be a note and mortgage from Bayou to Continental Republic, in the amount
of $65,000 which would bear interest at 9%, but that
$500 would be retained to pay the premium on an insurance policy, and that there would be a discount of $14,500
so that the net amount advanced would be $50,000.
Bainum handled the negotiations for Continental
Republic. Bainum had been familiar with usury laws of
states which permitted such discount and it was his
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opinion and lwliel' that such a discount would not make
t hP loan mmrious in Utah. (R. 242)
NP hwn, unknown to plaintiff was getting a cmnmis~ion from Bayou in addition to a $2000 commission from
plaintiff. (R. ~-l-~, -!45, p. 24, 446 p. 14) The court refused
to allow plaintiff to make Nelson a party to the suit.
Nelson arrangPcl the closing of the transaction, which
occurred September 7, 1961. (R. 446 p. 16) Continental
Republ:ie made its check in the amount of $65,000 payable
to Bayou and to McGhie Abstract Company. Bainum expected that :McGhie Abstract Company, in closing the
transaction, would cash the $65·,000 check and retain $15,000 for Continental Republic ($500 for the insurance premium and $14,500 as a discount) and that Nelson would
get a $2000 commission from Continental Republic from
the $14,500.
Unknown to Bainum, a $15,000 note bearing date of
August 10, 1961 payable from Bayou Country Club to
Frank Nelson was cancelled by Frank Nelson. The note
was marked ''Paid 9-12-61 Frank A. Nelson, Jr.," with
the further statement thereon "September 6, 1961. TO
\YHOM IT niAY CONCERN: The Bayou Country Club
is indebted to me personally, in the amount of $15,000."
(Signed) "Frank A. Nelson, Jr." (R. 448, p. 6, exhibit
I) Unknown to Bainum, this cancelled note was delivered
by Nelson to nicGhie Abstract Company as consideration
for the $15,000 portion of the loan, which Bainum anticipated would be treated as a payment of premium and a
discount. McGhie Abstract gave Nelson its check in the
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amount of $15,000 in payment for the $15,000 note from
Bayou to Nelson. (R. 448, p. 6, exhibit 5) What Nelson
did with it does not appear in the record but Bayou conceded that it received value to the extent of $500 for a
premium on an insurance policy. McGhie Abstract held
the remaining $50,000 for Bayou's account but earmarked
part for payment of mechanics liens and other encumbrances, so that it could issue a title policy insuring Continental Republic as mortgagee.
Five monthly payments totalling $3876.5,6 were made
by Bayou after which it defaulted on the loan. Continental Republic had to advance $1540.10 for taxes and fire
insurance on the mortgaged property, when Bayou failed
to pay for them. Continental Republic demanded payment of the note and mortgage and when the demand was
not met commenced a foreclosure proceeding.
The suit necessarily involved numerous parties including mechanics lien claimants. A receiver was appointed. The receiver employed Nolan Olsen, one of the
organizers of Bayou, and Bayou's attorney, as his attorney. Bayou counterclaimed in the foreclosure action
alleging usury.
After the commencement of the action and prior to
this appeal, Continental Republic Life Insurance Company was merged into National American Life Insurance
Company, which, as successor, inherited the problems
which arose from its predecessor's dealings.
Judge Hanson on pretrial ruled, as a matter of law,
that there was no consideration for $14,500 of the $65,000
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loan; that ~meh discount nutdP the loan usurious; that, in
addition to that portion of the n1onthly instalhnent paymPnts all<H·ahl<~ to intt>rest ($2630.27) the $14,500 discount
~houhl hP tn,blnd and awarded to Bayou. He also ruled
that I~a you was not estopped to assert usury. He left
two issue~ to be determined at the trial. (1) whether or
not the usury laws of the state of Utah are unconstitutional, and ( 2) the amount the parties should recover as
attorneys fees.
Judge Faux took evidence on only one issue, the
amount of attorneys fees. He held the usury statutes constitutional and awarded plaintiff judgment for the full
amount of its note together with advances but with no
inh'rP~t, in the total amount of $65,293.81 together with
$6000 attorneys' fees, and awarded Bayou, on its counterclaim for usury, $51,390.81, being the total of treble the
amount of $14,500 discount, treble the monthly instalment
payments of $2630.27 allocable to interest, and $5000 attorneys' fees.

STJ._TEMENT· OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHE'THE.R OR
NOT THE LOAN WAS USURIOUS.

Xo summary judgment determining that there was
a usurious transaction should have been entered.
''\\~ether a transaction is usurious is a question of fact, unless the instrument on its face shows
the exaction of an illegal rate of interest." Massie

v. Rubin, 270 F. 2d 60, 62.
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If it be assumed that Bayou received full value for
the $65,000 loan, there would be no usury, regardless of
how much plaintiff benefited from the loan.
In a similar situation, where the lender benefited hy
more than the maximum permissible interest rate, by
virtue of receiving from a broker a portion of the commission paid by the borrower, it was held that there was
no usury because the borrower received full value.
"Usury is not shown by the fact that a lender
receives from the borrower's agent, as a condition
of making the loan, half of the commission which
the borrower has already agreed to pay the agent
for his services in procuring the loan, although
the amount so received by the lender added to the
rate reserved for the loan, exceeds the legal rate
of interest-." Mortgage Bond Co. v. Stephens,
(1937) 181 Okla. 182, 72 P. 2d 831, 839. See also,
Pushee v. Johnson (1936) 123 Fla. 305, 166 S. 847,
105 ALR 789 and 55 Am. Jur. Usury Par. 71.
So, here, where Bayou's obligation to pay $15,000
was cancelled, the fact that plaintiff benefited by being
able to discount the $65,000 loan by the amount of $14,500
does not make the loan usurious.
The record indicates that value was received by
cancellation of the $15,000 note. There is no evidence
whatsoever that this note did not constitute a valid obligation. Neither Bayou nor Nelson has stated that no debt
was cancelled. It was pure surmise by Judge Hanson
that the note was fictitious. Nelson's version of the
transaction could not have been considered by Judge
Hanson because he did not even open Nelson's deposition.
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lt i:-; still in it~ :-;ealed envelope Inarked "Awaiting Order
ot' the Court." ~nnunary judgments were reversed in
~imilar situations in Thompson v. Ford J.l! ator Co., 14
l 'tah ~<l :~:~-t. :~S-t: P. 2d 109, and in Schubach v. Wagner,
1-l- Utah ~d 335, 384 P. 2d 110. Even if witnesses had
~tah'd the $15,000 note was fictitious, there would have
IH'Pll an issue of fact thereon. For Judge Hanson to rule,
hy way of summary judgn1ent on no evidence, that the
discharge of the note did not constitute consideration is
doubly erroneous.

''Summary judgment can properly be granted
under Rule 56 (c) only if 'the pleadings, depositions, and adinission on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which are offered, show without dispute that the party is entitled to prevail. This
condition is obviously not met if the allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint stand in opposition to
to the averments of the affidavits so that there
are controverted issues of fact, the determination
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the
parties." Christensen v. Financial Service Co.,
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, 1012.
Plaintiff denied all of the allegations of Bayou's
counterclaim thereby creating issues of fact (R. 25).
"In confronting the problem presented on this
appeal we have been obliged to remain aware that
a summary judgment, which turns a party out of
court without an opportunity to present his evidence, is a harsh measure that should be granted
only when, taking the view most favorable to a
party's claims and any proof that might properly
be adduced thereunder, he could in no event prevail" Kidman t'. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P. 2d

898, 900.
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The court there reversed a summary judgment because there were issues of fact which should have been
determined upon a trial. The court should do likewise
here.
POINT 2
THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER
OR NOT BAYOU SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT
USURY.

If it be assumed, however, that Judge Hanson was
correct in determining, on no evidence, that Bayou did
not receive value to the extent of $14,500 by having its
note for $15,000 satisfied, such determination must then
rest upon the conclusion that the $15,000 note was fictitious. In that event, plaintiff was entitled to show at a
trial that Bayou should be estopped to assert usury.
Such estoppel would result from proof that plaintiff
did not know the loan was usurious and did not know of
the $15,000 note, and that it was Bayou and Nelson who
did know the loan was usurious and conspired to create
a usurious loan, and that it would be inequitable to permit
Bayou to recover when Bayou, not plaintiff, conspired to
create a situation whereby Bayou could benefit by the
forfeitures and penalties awarded on its counterclaim.
"The acts of a borrower in securing a loan
may be such as to constitute fraud or to estop
him from taking advantage of the penalties provided for in the usury statutes. . . . Usury statutes are enacted to protect borrowers from the
demands of unscrupulous lenders, and not to
provide vehicles for unjust windfalls." Massie
v. Rubin, 270 F. 2d 60, 62. See also Nikkel v.
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Lindhorst, 85 Colo. 334, 276 P. 678 and annotation ();3 ALR 962.
POINT 3
P AYMEN'DS MAY BE ALLOTTED BY THE LENDER TO
PRINCIPAL RATHER THAN TO INTEREST AND THERE
IS THEREFORE NO PAYMENT OF INTERgST TO BE
TREBLED AS DAMAGES.

If it be assumed that there is usury, and that payments of interest by Bayou should be trebled and awardt>tl to Bayou, there is nothing to be trebled, because so
long as there is principal unpaid, allocations of payments
will be made to reduction of principal instead of to interest. 15-1-7 UCA provides for forfeiture of all interest to
be paid and for the recovery of three times the interest
paid:
"15-1-7. USURY- FORFE.ITURE OF ALL
INTEREST- TRIPLE DAMAGES FOR INTEREST ALREADY PAID-LIMITATION OF
ACION. - The taking, receiving, reserving, or
charging of a rate of interest greater than is allowed by section 15-1-2, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or
other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has
been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has been paid the person by
whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back three times the amount of
the interst thus paid from the receiver or taker
thereof and reasonable attorney fees, provided
that such action is commenced within two years
from the time the usurious transaction occurred."
Before applying such harsh treble damage provisionthe cases require that the borrower be actually out of
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pocket more than he has received from the lender. To
rule otherwise would permit a totally uninjured borrower
to get a windfall. Until the borrower has paid an amount
equal to the principal, there has been no injury. Therefore, not only the discount, but also the five instalment
payments which were made, should be allocated to reduce
the principal.
This rule was applied in the case of McBroom v.
Scottish Mortg. & Land Invest. Co. 7 153 U.S. 318, 328', 38
L. Ed. 729, 733, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 852, which arose under a
statute of New Mexico which provided that collection of
interest at a higher rate than 12 per cent was a misdemeanor, and which statute gave a right of action to the
borrower to collect double the amount so paid. Interest
notes were given upon a loan of $65,000.00 and a commission of 10 per cent upon the entire loan was paid to
the lender at the time of the transaction. After the first
interest note was paid7 the borrower brought suit to recover double the amount of the commission. Said the
U.S. Supreme Court:
"The contract of loan not being void, except
as to the excess of interest stipulated to be paid,
the question arises whether the lender is liable
to an action for the penalty prescribed by the
statute, so long as the principal debt, with legal
interest thereon, after deducting all payments, is
unpaid. We are of opinion that this question must
be answered in the negative. While, under the
statute, the mere charging of usurious interest
may be a misdemeanor for which the lender can
be fined, whether such usurious interest is or is
not collected or received, the borrower has no
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cau::-;p of ad ion until usurious interest has been aetually collect(•J or reeeived fr01n hun. Such cannot
bt> ::-;aid to havP ht>Pn collected or received, in excess
ol' what Inay be lawfully collected and received,
until the lender has in fact, after giving credit for
all payments, collected or received more than the
smn loaned. . . ." and, quoting from another case
the court continued:
"From the origin of the loan, from the retaining of the first discount, through all the renewals up to the time of final payment of the
principal, or up to the time of entering judgments,
there is a locus poenitentiae for the party taking
the excessive interest. Any time till then he may
consider the excessive interest paid on account of
the loan, and so apply it and lessen the principal.
Up to that time he may make this election. When
payment is actually made or judgment is entered
the election is made; and if, as in these cases,
judgment is entered for the face amount of the
notes or full amount of the loan, or payment is
taken in full without any reduction by taking out
the excessive interest, the cause of action is complete."
Other statements of the same rule are the following:
". . . as between the parties to the transaction, or holders with knowledge, all payments of
usurious interest made on the series of notes will
be applied by the law to the extinguishment of the
debt, and this even though the parties have treated
such payments as payments of interest. . . . "
Gladzcin State Bank v. Dow, 212 Mich. 521, 180
NW 601, 13 ALR 1233, 1243. See also Citizens
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National Bank v. Gentry, 111 Ky. 206, 63 S.W. 454,
56 LRA 673; First Natl. Bank v. Denson, 115 Ala.
650, 22 So. 815.
''. . . where partial payments are made on a
usurious loan, the bank may at any time before
payment of the principal apply the partial payment thereto and so avoid liability for the penalty
for taking unlawful interest." 55 Am. Jur., Usury,
Par. 151.
A recent case following the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the McBroom case, is Rukavina v. Accounts Supervision Corporation, 241 MA 195, 237 S.W.
2d 503, 508.
Bayou cannot assert that it has been damaged until
it has at least paid back a sum equal to the amount of
principal it received.
POINT 4
A DISCOUNT IS NOT SUBJECT TO BEING TREBLED.

If it be assumed there was usury, and that payments
cannot be allocated to principal, the only interest payment to be trebled would be a portion of the monthly instalment payments. The discount was never "paid" nor
is it "interest," both of which are required for any treble
damages under 15-1-7 UCA 1953 as amended:
"In case the greater rate of interest has been
paid, the person by whom it has been paid ...
may recover back three times the amount of the
interest thus paid from the receiver or taker thereof and reasonable attorney's fees ... "
Assuming, as Judge Hanson did, that Frank Nelson's
cancellation of Bayou's note for $15,000 was a sham and
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an effort 011 ~elson'~ part to disguise the fact that Bayou
had not n·<·Pi vPd the full $65,000, then the substance of
the transaction, regardless of the form it may have had,
wa~ that plaintiff discounh•d the loan. That might 1nake
the loan usurious, but would not constitute a payment
by I~ayou subject to being trebled. If Bayou paid $15,000
wlu.•n• did it gPt it~ It had no funds. It's only source was
plni ntiff's loan. If it in fact received the $15,000 and paid
it back, there would be no discount, and therefore no
usury at all. The only thing that might make the loan
usurious is a discount. Bayou is most illogical in asserting that the loan is usurious because it was discounted
$1:-l,OOO and asserting, at the same time, that it actually
paid out that same $15,000, and that very discount should
lw trebled along with the trebling of installment payments allocable to interest, under our statute which
trC'bles only interest paid.
" ... the requirement of actual payment is not
satisfied by the circumstance that when the evidence of the debt was executed and the loan made,
a usurious discount was reserved. Deductions by
way of a discount when money for a loan is advanced are not treated as payments, because they
do not come out of the debtor's pocket, even
though they lessen the amount which he receives,
and even though when sued for the amount advanced he may plead usury and escape liability
for the amount thus charged and retained. . . ."
53Am. Jur. Usury, Par. 149. Brown v. Marion
National Bank, 169 U.S. 416, ±2 L. Ed. 801 18 S.
Ct. 390, Citizens National Bank v. Forman' (Citizens National Bank v. Gentry) 111 Kentucky 206,
63 S. \V. 454, 56 LRA 673.
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If anything is to be trebled it should only be payments allocable to interest, and not the amount of any
discount.
POINT 5
THE USURY LAWS OF UTAH ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

15-1-2 UCA 1953, as amended, provides, in part:
"15-1-2. MAXIMUM RATES. - The parties to any contract may agree in writing for the
payment of interest for the loan or forebearance
of any money, goods or things in action, not to
exceed ten per cent per annum; provided:

* * *
" (d) That licensees under
Loan Act may contract for and
at the rates and subject to the
vided in chapter 10, Title 7, Utah
1953;

the Utah Small
receive interest
limitations proCode Annotated

* * *
"(f) That industrial loan corporation may
contract for and receive interest and charges at
the rates subject to the limitations contained in
chapter 8, Title '7, Utah ·Code Annotated 1953;
"(g) That any corporation, except small loan
licensees, operating under the supervision of the
state banking department of Utah, and any national bank or federal savings and loan association doing business in the state may add to or deduct in advance from the proceeds of any loan repayable in installments over a period of not more
than 63 months and not exceeding $5,000.00 in
principal amount, interest or discount at a rate
not exceedi~g seven per cent per annum upon the
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principal amount of the loan for the entire period
therE· of; ... "
This ~tatute purports to "protect" sophisticated borrowPrs like Bayou, a corporation organized and operated
t n makP a profit, from high interest rates, instead of
.. proh•d ing" unsophisticated lower economic income
groups such as small loan borrowers, who can be charged
high rates.
The statute also has the effect of permitting the
general lending public to charge a maximum of 10%,
while at thl' same time it creates favored lending classes
which ean charge the following rates:

U.C.A.

Maximum
Provision

Small Loan Companies, 7-10-3

3% per month

Credit Unions,

Reasonable rates
as provided by
directors,

Industrial Loan
Companies,
Banks and SavingJS
and Loans,

7-9- 2
7-9-11

7-8-3

15'-1-2

Approximate
effective
rate
per annum

36%
Reasonable

Deduct 1% per month
in advance plus other
charges

37%

Deduct 7% per annum
in advance

14ro

In addition thereto, other acts allow other favored lendPrs to charge the following percentages:
Pawnbrokers',
Conditional Seller,

11-6-2
15-l-2a

5% per month for
6 months

60%

1% per month times
number of months of
contract

24%
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This variation violates the provisions of Article I,
Section 24, of the Utah Constitution, which provides:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
A recent case construing this provision was Justice
vs. Standard Gilsonite Company, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.
2d 97 4. There the court held that an act which provided
for a penalty for failure to pay wages within 24 hours
after demand therefor was unconstitutional in its arbitrary exclusion of banks and mercantile houses from its
provisions. The court said that the preferential treatment
of banks was unreasonable. Applying this reasoning of
the Justice case to usury, the preferential treatment of
banks concerning permissible interest charges is unreasonable. There is no more reason to allow a bank to
charge 14% interest under 15-1-2 than there is to allow
a life insurance company or any other company or individual to do so. The State of Washington has so held.
In a similar situation where a statute provided for a
maximum rate of 12%, but provided that banks, etc.,
should be excepted therefrom, the act was held unconstitutional because it granted special privileges. Acme Finance Company v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. 2d 341,348.
The court said:
"·Consolidating these sections and reducing
the matter to its lowest terms, we have, remaining, a law which says, in effect : Any persons,
firm or corporation, except a bank, trust company,
building and loan association, credit union, industrial loan company, licensed pawnbroker, one
making casual loans of his own money, or a retail
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merchant selling under conditional sales contra(·t~, who, by any Inethod, including the receipt
of diseount~, or by making service or carrying
charges or examination fees, charges a greater
rate of interest than 12 per cent per annum simple
inten'st on loans of $300 or less, shall be guilty
of a gross misdemeanor, ...
'~It seems to us that a mere statement of the
matter is all that is required to show that the act,
or, more accurately speaking, what remains of it,
is unlawfully discriminatory. The excepted classes
are so numerous and varied and cover such a
broad field that the act, in fact, does not have the
semblance of a general law, but of a special one
aimed at a special and limited class. It clearly
denies to that class the equal protection of the
laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Alnendment to the Federal Constitution, because,
among other things, it permits the classes excepted
by section 14 the right to collect service and
carrying charges, etc., over and above the lawful
12 per cent interest rate, and provides a criminal
penalty for all others who do so. By the same
token, it grants to the excepted classes special
privileges and immunities in violation of Article
1, Sec. 12, of the State Constitution. There is no
warrant for so arbitrary a classification, especially in a criminal statute. The injury done by a
usurious loan is the same when the loan is made
by a bank or trust company or a licensed pawnbroker as when made by any one else."

The Utah act also creates special privileges and is
like·wise unconstitutional. Utah's differentiation as to
interest rates, depending on what lender is involved, is
based upon no real difference in situation and circum-
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stances. For example, Utah credit unions and savings
and loans get preferential treatment. It has been argued
that higher charges by such institutions are justified by
the fact that they are cooperatives with benevolent objectives. Assuming high interest rates are bad, however,
the fact that they are charged by a mutual institution is
no justification therefor, if the following reasoning has
any validity:
"The Legislature has suspended the general
law in regard to usury for the benefit of the appellant, seemingly to promote the benevolent objects
in view. The profit made does not ultimately benefit all the stockholders. Those who can live without borrowing from the association, and whose
stock is not liable to be forfeited for the nonpayment of dues, will ultimately realize the large
profits resulting from such usurious loans at the
expense of those who have paid from twenty to
fifty per cent for the use of the money. The fact
that the money is loaned by the corporation to one
of its members can make no difference. The entire
transaction is against the letter and the spirit of
the statute against usury."

Henderson Building and Loan Association v.
Johnson, 88 Ky. 191, 10 S.W. 787, 788.
Nebraska has recognized that preferential treatment
of a conditional seller is unreasonable and unconstitutional special legislation. Stanton v. JJfattson, 175 Neb.
767, 123 NW 2d 844 involved the constitutionality of the
Nebraska conditional sales act providing for a 12% rate
on conditional sales, which was in excess of the 9%
general usury rate. Nebraska has a constitutional pro-
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vi~ion ~imilnr

to tiH' Utah provision prohibiting special
laws n·~ulatin~ intPn·~t. T·he Nebraska provision is
Artidt> Ill, Sec. 1S, of the Constitution which provides,
in part:

"The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, that is to
say: ... regulating the interest on money."
rrhe Nebraska court held the conditional sales act unconstitutional as being special legislation on several grounds,
among whirh was the ground that there can be no valid
distinetion between interest rates on secured and unsecured loans. The court said :
''It is provided in Sec. 1 ( 5) of Legislature
Bill811, in part, as follows :
'Retail installment contract or contracts shall
mean an agreement . . . pursuant to which . . . a
liPn upon the goods is retained ... by the seller
as security for the payment of the retail install~
ment contract' . . . .
·~Legislative

Bill 811 is an interest statute.

"\Ve fail to see any connection between the fixing

of an interest rate and the fact that security for
the loan is taken or the title to the property retained. The provision is special and not general.
It therefore is inhibited by Article III, Sec. 18, of
the N~braska constitution."
Ftah has a similar exception to 15-1-2 as a subparagraph 15-1-:.2a which allows a conditional seller to charge
a higher rate of interest than a seller who either has no
sPrurity or takes other security, which likewise is special
legislation.
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Nebraska had separate successive statutes. The prior
one set a general usury rate of 9% ( 45-101 Revised Statutes Nebraska Cumulative Supplement 1961). A later
separate act (Laws of Nebraska 1963 p. 805) provided
. for a higher rate for a conditional seller, "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law." Unlike Nebraska,
Utah's general rate and exception thereto for conditional
sellers were created by one act, Chapter 24, Laws of Utah,
1953, the title to which is as follows:
"CONTR.A:CTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN
GENERAL
Chapter 24
INTERE8T
"AN ACT TO AMEND· SE:CTION 15-1-2, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 19·53, RELATING TO
MAXIMUM RATES; AND ENACTING A
NEW SECTION TO BE KNOWN AS SEC·TION 15-1-2a, UTAH 'GOD·E ANNOTATED
1953; PROVIDING FOR THE REHULATION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE CONDITIONAL SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAiL PROPERTY AND PROVIDING FOR
THE MAXIMUM RATES TO BE CHARGED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND
PROVIDING PE·NALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS."
Therefore, whereas Nebraska h_eld only the separate act
creating the exception to be invalid as special legislation,
Utah's usury law within its own framework creates special situations, so that instead of having only invalid exceptions, Utah has an invalid act. This is similar to the
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~ituat ion in

Jnstice u. Standard Gilsonite Company, 12
(!tah ~d :~~>7, 366 P. ~d 97-l:, where the gilsonite company,
whieh was not one of those favored by being in an ex('Pp!Pd cah·gory, established the invalidity of the entire
<Wt relating to wages because the act unreasonably ex<'t•ph•<l hank~, etc. In the case at bar, the life insurance
eompany, whieh is not one of those favored by being in an
l'XePpted category, seeks to establish the invalidity of the
entire act relating to interest, because the act unreasonably excepts hanks, etc. The fact that one deals with
wages and another with interest may be pointed out by
Bayou as a distinction. It is a difference, but an immah•rial difference. The court's reasoning is applicable to
both cases.
In addition to the express prohibition of enactment
of special laws relating to interest on money, Article VI,
~~.·etion :ZG, provides:
"In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
There can certainly be no argument with the proposition
that a general1naximum interest rate can be applicable to
all situations. The various special exceptions to favored
lenders is a clear violation of this provision.
Tennessee and Kentucky have both ruled on similar
provisions :
~~ Tennessee constitutional provision that interest
rates shall be uniform throughout the state and a constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity both pre-
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elude the legislature from empowering the charging of a
higher rate of interest by Small Loan Act companies only.
In Family Loan Company v. Hickeson, 168 Tenn. 36, 73
SW 2d 694, 94 A.L.R. 664, 666, the court said:
"The Legislature could not clothe small loan
companies with the right to uniformly charge all
borrowers the maximum fees of 3 per cent per
month, in addition to interest on all loans. Had the
act been open to no construction other than that
it conferred power upon loan companies to charge
the maximum fee without reference to the service
rendered, it would have been the duty of the court
to declare the act void because violative of article
11, Sec. 7, of the Constitution, and because unreasonably discriminatory against other money
lenders."
A special statute authorizing a corporation to charge
a higher interest rate than that allowed by the general
law was held to be unconstiutional in Kentucky. Gordon
v. Winchester Building and Accumulating Fund Association, 75 Ky 110, 23 Am. Rep. 713.
Plaintiff does not have to rely on the above general
provisions, however, because the constitution has specifically covered 18 particular categories wherein there is a
specific prohibition against special treatment. Among
these 18 topics is usury. Article VI, Section 26, provides,
in part:
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special laws in the following cases:

• • •
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"9.

HP~ulating

the interest on money.

"10.
"11. Regulating county and township affairs."
"12.
Our supren1e court has had occasion to consider
whether or not various acts relating to the 11th category
have hl't'n "special laws." In State v. Standford, 24 Utah
148, titi P. 1061, the court held unconstitutional an act
whi<'h was applicable only to some counties, because it
did not have uniform operation throughout the State.
The court said:
"The state legislature is forbidden to pass any
private or special laws regulating county affairs.
The laws enacted must be uniform generally, and
applicable to all of the counties throughout the
state. In Welsh v. Bramlet, supra, it is said:
'\Vhenever it attempts to enact a law for one or
1nore of the counties of the state upon subjects
that it is directed to provide for by general laws,
or which are to form part of a uniform system for
the whole state, whether such counties are designated directly by nan1e, or by reference to a class
into which they have. been placed for other subjects of legislation, it infringes these provisions of
the constitution. . . . "
In Lehi City v. JI eiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530,
5-!7, ~I r. Justice \Y olfe in his concurring opinion, said:

"The Legislature could not pass an act specifically directed at Salt Lake City or some other
particular municipality."
In State r. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 898,
the court said that the constitution
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"
requires that all laws shall operate uniformly wherever uniform laws can be enacted.
While it is true that this court, in common with
others, has repeatedly held that legislative subjects may be classified and that legislative classification should not be interferred with by the
courts unless such classification is clearly fanciful, capricious, arbitrary, or unnatural, yet, where
such is the case, it becomes the duty of the courts
to uphold the constitutional rights and privileges
in that regard."
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375
P. 2d 756, the court held the Civic Auditorium Act to be
an unconstitutional special law, saying:
"As to the contention that the act violates
Art. XI, sec. 5, prohibiting special laws to create
municipal corporations, Art. VI, sec. 26, dealing
with limited powers of the legislature, saying that
where a general law can be applicable, no special
law is enactable, and Art. I, sec. 24, providing that
general laws must have uniform operation, we
have the following to say :
"The act provides for a commission to operate
an auditorium in counties having over 250,000
population.
". . . Although dealing with constitutional
problems concerning county government, we think
the reasoning of State ex rel. Wright v. Stand ford
apropos here. There the act held unconstitutional
provided for inspectors in counties having 5,000
or more fruit trees and for deputies in counties
having over 20,000 population. We had this to say:
". . . 'The Act was doubtless intended to
apply . . . to certain particular counties, to the
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Pxdusion of othurs . . . The act is therefore not
uniform throughout the state,' ... "
..~:\ pplying

the rPmwning of the Standford, Lehi and
B:u·kmnn ca~P~ to the ~Hh (•ategory, instead of to counties
nndPr tlw 11th category, the usury law is special legislation lwl'aUSP of its various rates for various lenders
dt'pPnding upon what hat the lender wears.
Our Supreme Court has already ruled that the Industrial Loan Act is a special act in Peoples Finance &
Thrift ComJ)(lll!J v. Var11cy, 7·5 Utah 355, 285 P. 30-±, 305.
The court was there attempting to ascertain whether the
then general1naxhnum rate of 12% should be applicable
to loans made by an Industrial Loan Company or whether
the higher ratP permitted by the Industrial Loan Act
should be given effect. The court expressly noted that
the constitutionality of the Industrial Loan Act of 1925
was not bP being questioned and then gave effect to the
Industrial Loan Act interest provision because it was a
special act. The court said:
.. . . . If such an interpretation be not in harmony with the general usury statute, then it is
more reasonable to hold that the L€gislature, by
the statute of 1925, intended, so far as the general
usury statute may apply to industrial loan companies as defined by the act of 1925, to make an
exception to the general usury statute, or, in so
far as powers ·were conferred on such companies
to n1ak:e loans, to regard them not as coming under, or as being controlled by, the general usury
statute. The validity of the 1925 act is not challenged. Thus, should there be a conflict between
the general statute and the 1925 act, the former
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must give way to the latter, which is a special
and subsequent act, and which expressly repeals
'all laws in conflict' therewith."
If it were not for the decision in Justice v. Starndard
Gilsonite Co., (supra), it might well be argued that the
special exceptions to the general 10% limitation should
be held invalid, but the 10% limitation should nevertheless
be valid. The Justice case, however, holds that the
entire act is void. There the entire act requiring payment of wages within 24 hours was held void because
banks were excluded from the statute. The court did not
hold that the exceptions did not apply. So here, 15-1-2
contains discriminatory exceptions and the entire act is
therefore void.
The following article shows that government regulation of interest rates has little to justify it either economically or morally:
"In the United States usury is a statutory
matter, and usurious rates are determined by
reference to specific statutes. Although historically the term usury was synonymous with interest
and applied to any cost paid for the use of money,
the need for capital led to a narrowing of the definition to the charging of interest by a lender in
excess of a legally prescribed rate. In early Egypt
the maximum rate was set by law at 30%, and in
the heyday of the Roman Empire, 50% was not
considered excessive. The trend toward freedom
of interest rates suffered a reverse during the
Middle Ages, when money lenders became associated by a church-dominated society with wickedness and avarice. However, with the reappearance and further development of economics as a
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~eienm·, mo~t nations in \V estern Europe and five
Amerieun states by the end of the 19th century
had abandoned any serious atten1pts at interest
n·~triction. rrhe umximum-rate principle was retained in the great majority of states, however,
and today 10 jurisdictions have maxin1um lawful
contract rates of 6o/o, 26 range from 7% to 11%,
and 13 states allow 12% or more, including those
with no limit."

"One of the basic tenets of a free enterprise
economy is that buyers and sellers, borrowers
and lenders, are expected to compete in open markets for goods and services, including those of
a financial nature, and indeed, apart from usury
legislation of the type to be considered here, conventional mortgage interest rates are determined
almost completely by market conditions.
'" \Vhen there is a shortage of something, the
price of it goes up. Interest rates, of which mortgage rates are an important part, represent, the
price paid by the borrower for the use of the lender's money. Rates in the money market are not
set by any diabolical collusion among banks, savings associations, or other lenders ; when the nation as a whole decides to spend more money on
goods than can be financed out of the current
flow of savings, interest rates go up. While the
principle is well understood in the financial community, it unfortunately is true that this economic
fact is not fully understood by some legislators
and a large segment of the public. . . .
"Some say that morality enters into the matter of determining the amount of interest to be
paid. obviously this is true, but it also is true that
a maximum-interest-rate law cannot be considered to be a declaration of any valid moral law.
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If the collection of interest on money lent is moral
at all, it does not cease to be moral at 6%. Indeed,
it would be hard to reconcile any such theory with
the conclusion that the 30% maximum interest
rate legal in Rhode Island is moral, while any
excess over the legal 6% rate in the neighboring
state of New York is immoral.
"·That arbitrary rate ceilings have little to do
with morality is demonstrated by their across-theboard applicability and their general failure to
make any exception based upon the ability or willingness to pay. A man who borrows not from
need but from an incentive to accumulate more
money has the same rate ceiling applied to his
loan as the unemployed man who borrows to buy
food. Any alleged morality of rate-fixing also becomes horned in some states on the dilemma of the
large versus the 'small' loan. In Illinois, for example, small loans may bear interest of 36%,
whereas 'large' loans generally are limited to 7%.
Considered from the moral aspect of need, the
person unable to offer security for a larger loan
ordinarily is a much needier individual than the
person who can. Yet for this needier individual
a 36% rate is legal (hence moral) while for the
larger borrower 8% is illegal (hence immoral).
Morality as applied to a business corporation contracting voluntarily to pay a specified rate for its
use of borrowed money is another nonsequitur;
fortunately this has been recognized by statute in
21 states where corporations have been excepted
from application of the usury laws. Although
morality may be associated with excessive rate, it
fails to follow that a rate ceiling applicable to all
parties at all times is a manifestation of that
morality.
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'"It. is trtw that price ceilings under some circause little trouble. For exrunple, a
p ri<'P ceiling of $1.00 a point placed on butter
would ~ause little concern today among the butter
V\'ndors. This is true because the current price
is approximately 70c a pound. If demand incn·a~Pd, however, or the supply dwindled, the
price ceiling overnight could become important.
('.umstmwl'~

"This is precisely what has happened in the
ease of rate ceilings placed on mortgage lending
by interest-rate limitations and the usury laws
in several eastern states. Having remained on
the books without change since the early days of
the republic when the economy was largely agricultural, a state usury law which fixes the rate
celing at 6% appears to be as anachronistic today
a8 the date of the legislation bears. The result
is a bittt>r paradox, since the ceilings which were
intended to help and protect the borrower succeed
only in drying up his local sources of money;
lenders will turn elsewhere, where the rates are
more realistic.
"\Yhile possibly justifiable in times of national emergency, it can be seen that arbitrary
price-fL~ing, both from the economic and the moral
standpoints, represents a philosophy generally
at odds with the concept of a private-enterprise,
peact>time economy. Indeed, when the price-fixing
is allo,ved to prevail at unrealistic levels the deleterious effects upon the economy can be severe."
[~nited States Sa~·ings & Loan League Bulletin.
July 1960, p. 125-8.
There should, therefore, be no economic nor moral compunction to sustain our usuary laws.
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The Utah Supreme Court has not directly considered
the constitutionality of the usury statutes. Some dicta,
however, are quoted:
Mr. Justice Wade in a concurring opinion in Seaboard Finance Compa.ny v. Wahlen, 123 Utah 529, 260
P. 2d 556, 563, said :
"It seems to be to be highly inconsistent to
prohibit a man from charging more than 10 per
cent interest on a loan to his neighbor or business
acquaintance, but at the same time allow a finance company to charge 37 per cent for same
loan."
Mr .. Justice Henriod in a dissenting opinion in Rossberg v. Holesapple, 123 Utah 544, 260 P. 2d 563, 569, said:
"One wonders what the majority would conclude had Rossberg obtained the money from an
industrial loan company, when we recently approved a charge by such a company of 37% interest, far in excess of the percentage involved in
this case."
Mr. Justice Wade in a dissenting opinion in the
Rossberg case, (supra at 570) said:
"Undoubtedly the statute was originally enacted to curb what is referred to as the loan shark
business. It was intended to curb unconscionable
charges made by professional lenders of money.
But our statute, although very rigid and harsh in
its remedy, now allows exceptions to its strict provisions in favor of the very people it was originally intended to curb. As we have noticed in the
Seaboard Finance Co. case an industrial loan
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company may eharge as much as 31% interest on
its loan~ w i t.h iinpunity. I cannot understand how
our u~ury ~tatute is constitutional when the evil
which it wa~ intended to curb is expressly permitted to flourish under exceptions to that statute."
\Ye rely on the reasoning applied in the Nebraska
en::-;P, that unr('asonable exceptions create unconstitutional stwciallegislation. Combining that with the reasoning in the Justice case, that an act which has exceptions
is itself invalid, the conclusion is that 15-1-2 and 2a are
unconstitutional.
As evidenced by national publicity given to the Nedecision (Time Magazine, November ____ , 19'63)
Nebra~ka's economy is in chaos from the withdrawal of
~wllt>rs and lenders from Nebraska because it is economically impossible for them to do business within a 9%
nu1...'{iinum rate. Such would not be the result of a decision of unconstitutionality here. A ruling of unconstitutionality in this case would result in the elimination of all
artificial economic controls aand would enable the law
of supply and demand to operate in a free economy to set
interest rates.
bra~ka

We conclude that there is no reasonable basis for the
many preferential special rates contained in 15-1-2 and

15-1-2a. Kentucky was held that interest limitations
which except cooperatives such as savings and loans
and credit unions are unreasonable. Henderson Building
and Loan Association v. Johnson, (supra). Washington
has held that interest limitations which except banks,
trust companies, building and loan associations, credit
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unions, industrial loan companies, licensed pawn brokers,
casual lenders and conditional sellers, are unreasonable,
Acme Finance Comparny v. Huse (supra). Nebraska has
held that interest limitations which except secured lenders
are unreasonable. Stanton v. Mattson} (supra). Utah has
the same exceptions, which, are likwise unreasonable,
which make the interest rate unreasonably dependent
upon who the lender is rather than such reasonable factors as need of the borrower, risk, size of loan, etc. The
unreasonable exceptions constitute special legislation.
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company (supra).
POINT 6
DE·FENDANT''S ATTORNEYS FEES ON IT'S OOUNTE&.
CLAlM SHOULD BE REDUCED AS ITS AWARD ON ITS
COUNT'ERCLAIM 18 REDUCED.
1

Any reduction in recovery by Bayou in its counterclaim should be reflected in a reduction of the atttorney's
fee awarded Bayou, since the award of attorney's fees
was based in part upon the amount recovered, If Bayou
obtains no offest, it is entitled to no attorneys fees,
since the allowance of attorneys fees is tied by our statute
to the successful recovery of treble damages. Rukavina
v. Accounts Sttpervision Corporation (supra).
CONCLUSION
Utah usury statutes are unconstitutional because
they do not have uniform operation and are special legislation, (Point 5). This requires that plaintiff's award be
increased by the amount of accrued interest and Bayou
should have no offsetting award on its counterclaim.
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Furl ll\'l'lliOn', sim·p payments may be alloted by the
lttndPr in n·dud ion of principal, Bayou must actually

paid uwnPy out of its own pocket, rather than merely pay back funds received from plaintiff before Bayou
should n·coVl'l' treble drunages (Point 3), which is an
additional reason Bayou's award on its counterclaim
~hould be eli1ninated.

haVl'

Furthermon', a discount is a reduction of the principal advaneed by the lender, not a payment of interest
by the borrower, and is not to be trebled and awarded
to Bayou (Point-±). This, alone, would require a reduction of Bayou's offset on its counterclaim of treble the
$14,500 or $43,500.
Furthermore, there was an issue of fact as to whether
or not Bayou received value by cancellation of its $15,000
obligation to Nelson (Point 1) or whether or not if there
was usury, Bayou should be estopped to assert it (Point
~). Either would require a reversal of the award on
Bayou's counterclaim and a remand for trial.
If there is any reduction of Bayou's offset, its attorney's fees should be reduced proportionately (Point 6).
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT "\Y. HUGHES and
BRAYTON, LOWE & HTJRJLEY
JOHN W. LOWE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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